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The Line-Item Veto: The Best Response
When Congress Passes One Spending
"Bill" a Year
L. Gordon Crovitz*
There has never been a prop used in a State of the Union address
quite like the one President Ronald Reagan used in 1988. He pointed
to a stack of paper several inches thick. The stack was the year's
Continuing Resolution, a method of putting all government funds
into one giant budget bill that the President must either sign or veto
and close down the government. President Reagan threatened never
to sign another such behemoth. Under the 1974 Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act,' Congress is supposed to pass thirteen sepa-
rate appropriations bills. It is no coincidence that Congress has
repeatedly failed to meet its own legal requirements, that the same
law purported to end the presidential impoundment power, and that
the federal budget deficit has exploded since the 1974 budget
"reform."
This paper attempts to set out one possible constitutional response
by the President to the current practice of presenting the entire
budget of the United States in one piece of legislation usually de-
scribed as a Continuing Resolution. By adopting this procedure of an
all-in-one budget "bill," Congress has effectively vitiated the veto
power guaranteed by the presentment clause2 by creating a Hobson's
choice of signing for all spending or vetoing all spending. This article
argues for the exercise of the inherent line-item veto in these circum-
* L. Gordon Crovitz is assistant editor of the editorial page of The Wall Street
Journal, where his Rule of Law column appears weekly. He is the co-editor of THE
FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (American
Enterprise Institute 1989). He received his bachelor's degree from the University of
Chicago, a law degree from Wadham College, Oxford, and a J.D. from Yale Law
School.
1. Congressional Budget and Independent. Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 681-688 (1982)).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
stances as a proportionate response to an abuse of the presentment
clause by Congress. Indeed, although the action has attracted little
attention, President George Bush, in November 1989, exercised the
line-item veto through a signing statement. As described below, it is
significant that no one has challenged his legal right to do so.
I. THE GLAzIER THESIS
I'd like to test [the line-item veto] the way it is. I can't quite find the right
case. I'm sure you're familiar with the theory that the President has that in-
herent power, and if I found the proper, narrowly-defined case, I'd like to try
that and let the courts decide whether it's there.
-President George Bush.3
The theory that President Bush has embraced was first publicly
presented by Stephen Glazier,4 in an article published by The Wall
Street Journal. This and several subsequent articles5 set out a new
view of the interplay between the constitutional powers of the legis-
lative and executive branches of government in the handling of the
federal budget. The issue is important because of the continuing de-
bate over the federal deficit, which has grown inexorably since Con-
gress adopted, over the veto of President Richard Nixon, the Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which purported to deprive
the President of the power to impound funds.6
The argument for a line-item veto requires a close analysis of how
a legislative provision first becomes a bill and then becomes a law.
This process is more complex than commonly thought. Two constitu-
tional clauses govern the question. The first is Article I, § 7, Clause
2, which states in relevant part, "Every Bill which shall have passed
the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become
a Law, be presented to the President of the United States" for his sig-
nature or veto.7 The Glazier thesis relies on the next clause which
3. Interview of President George Bush with Knight-Ridder News Service, White
House, (July 25, 1989)(on file with White House Office of Press Secretary).
4. Stephen Glazier is an attorney now practicing in Washington, D.C.
5. Reagan Already Has Line-Item Veto, Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1987, at A14, col. 4; see
Glazier, Line-Item Veto Hides Under an Alias, Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1988, at A26, col. 4;
Glazier, A Plank Bush Should Stand On, Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1988, at A14, col. 4. Edi-
tors at The Wall Street Journal, including this writer, were at first skeptical that there
could be an inherent power in the President to exercise a line-item veto. No President
had claimed such a power before, and several Presidents had campaigned for a statute
or constitutional amendment to grant a line-item veto. Mr. Glazier's thesis was origi-
nal enough to be published and persuasive enough to be a magnet for constitutional
analysis. See, e.g., NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTERFST, PORK BARRELs
AND PRINCIPLES: THE POLITICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO (1988) [hereinafter PORK
BARRELS].
6. "[I]mpoundment occurs whenever the President spends less than Congress ap-
propriates for a given period." Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President The Consti-
tutional Issue, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 124, 124 (1969).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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begins: "Every Order, Resolution, or Vote, to Which the Concur-
rence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary
(except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the
President of the United States .... ,,s
This is curious language indeed. Clause 2 refers simply to the re-
quirement that "every bill" be presented to the President. Clause 3
was clearly an effort by the Founders to prevent Congress from evis-
cerating the President's veto power by using legislative legerdemain
to evade presentment altogether, or to describe legislation as a "bill"
that is in fact a bundling of many bills as a way to increase congres-
sional leverage over the President to avoid a veto. Under this reading
of Clause 3, the phrase "Every Order, Resolution, or Vote" was in-
tended to encompass every then-recognized stratagem for undermin-
ing the presentment procedure.
There is strong evidence from the constitutional debate that the
Founders intended Clause 3 as a defense of the presentment clause
that a President could invoke to maintain the intended separation of
powers. On August 15, 1787, James Madison suggested to the Consti-
tutional Convention that Clause 2 alone was inadequate to limit Con-
gress. Madison argued, "If the negative of the President was
confined to bills; it would be evaded by acts under the form and
name of Resolutions, votes, & c ... ."9 He proposed that "or resolve"
be added to Clause 2 after "bill," to make the reference to "Every bill
or resolve." The use of "& c" indicates that Madison was hoping to
find some term of art that would cover any possible legislative tech-
nique to avoid calling a bill a "bill."
The reports of the Constitutional Convention indicate that "after a
short and rather confused conversation on the subject,"10 Madison's
proposal was defeated. The next day, however, Edward Jennings
Randolph offered an alternative provision. His proposal was accepted
and became Clause 3, with its reference to "Every Order, Resolution
or Vote," which would be subject to presidential veto just as would a
"bill" under Clause 2.11 As Stephen Glazier concluded,
In contemplating a bicameral legislature that could act only by majority vote
of each house, Randolph had found the broadest possible formula in the lan-
guage of the day to describe the "etceteras" of "form and name," as yet not
invented or described, that Madison feared. It only remained for future Con-
8. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 3.
9. J. MADISON, JOURNAL AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 536-37 (1893)
(emphasis in original).
10. Id. at 537.
11. Id.
greases to invent it and name it, in order for the President to be able to veto
it.,,1 2
By clarifying the reference in Clause 2 to "bill," it seems likely
that the Founders anticipated congressional efforts to evade the risk
of a veto in either of two ways. One would be for Congress to label a
provision something other than a "bill" in order to avoid presentment
at all. The other would be to create a "bill" that in fact contained
many more items than it would in the natural scheme of statutory
drafting, that is, than it would but for the effort to avoid constitu-
tional presentment. Under this second method, Congress could use
bundling of some kind to present the President with a series of bills
masquerading as one.
Indeed, the question of who decides what "bill" means goes to the
core of the issue. The closely related question of whether the Presi-
dent may veto non-germane riders raises the question of whether the
President can unbundle legislation for presentment purposes. For
example, if Congress announces that it has presented all of its legisla-
tive business in a single "bill" at the end of each session, does a Presi-
dent have to treat this as a single "bill" for veto purposes? Is it closer
to the intent of the Founders for a President to swallow all of the
legislative pronouncements of a session in one decision to sign or
veto, or for him to sign parts and veto other parts? Under any theory
of accountable government, it seems clear that, when necessary, the
President should break down legislation in such a way as to reflect
the Founders' concern for "Every Order, Resolution or Vote."
There is some evidence from the Founders that a President should
exercise a veto which is proportionate- to the legislation presented to
him. In .The Federalist, Hamilton made an argument about the veto
power that makes sense only with a flexible veto, one that could in-
clude a line-item veto. Hamilton worried that the risk was that a
President would exercise the veto less frequently than he should
rather than too often. The wording of Hamilton's argument is signifi-
cant: "It is evident that there would be greater danger of his not us-
ing his power when necessary, than of his using it too often or too
much.' 3 Using a veto too often can be understood under the current
interpretation of the extent of a possible veto; "too often" might
mean, for example, vetoing half of all bills. But what can "too much"
mean? it seems likely that this refers to using the veto power not too
much in the sense of vetoing too many bills, but instead refers to us-
12. Glazier, The Line-Item Veto: Provided in the Constitution and Traditionally
Applied, in PoRK BARRELS, supra note 5, at 9-10.
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 497 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). I am in-
debted for the observation of the Hamilton quotation and the reading of its meaning to
Don Mark North, The Item Veto: Has It Been There All Along? (August 24, 1990) (pa-
per on file, Pepperdine. University Law Review).
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ing the veto too much within a single bill-such as, for example, ve-
toing half of the provisions of a single bill. This excess, of course,
would only be possible if Presidents can veto parts of a '%ill," such as
by use of a line-item veto.
There is good historical evidence that the veto power of the Consti-
tution as understood by its Eighteenth Century drafters and ratifiers
includes what we now call a line-item veto. Professor Forrest Mc-
Donald has noted that the body that reviewed legislation passed by
the colonies between 1696 and 1776, which was created by His Maj-
esty's Privy Council and called the Board of Trade, routinely exer-
cised a line-item veto.14 "During the course of that eighty-year
period the Board reviewed 8,563 pieces of legislation," Professor Mc-
Donald has reported.15 "The members made it clear almost from the
beginning, in 1702, that the veto that they were exercising in the
name of the Crown was a selective veto, a line-item veto."16 Profes-
sor McDonald wrote that the Board of Trade vetoed all or part of 469
pieces of legislation during that period.17
Professor McDonald wrote that after the colonial experience, the
states followed a system under which "appropriations were always
permissive, not mandatory."18 That is, the legislature voted a sum
and the governor could spend up to that amount at his discretion-he
could spend less but not more. This is the earliest version of the im-
poundment power discussed below, which is closely related to the
line-item veto. Professor McDonald reported that "Anti-Federalist
tracts against the Constitution objected to the Constitution, among
other reasons, because Article I, § 7, Clause 3 made too strong a line-
item veto in the hands of the President."19
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton and President
George Washington continued to take the position that appropria-
tions were permissive and not mandatory, and shifted funding around
fairly freely. President Thomas Jefferson refused to spend $50,000
appropriated by Congress for gunboats. The expectation that we
would have a war with Spain dampened while Congress was in re-
cess, but this amounted to a line-item, absolute veto--an impound-
14. McDonald, The Framerm' Conception of the Veto Power, in PORK BARRELS,
supra note 5, at 2.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2.
18. Id. at 3.
19. Id. at 5.
ment.20 It is important to remember, however, that the question of
the line-item veto of spending by a President would not have been a
pressing issue in the first 150 years or so of the Republic. As Profes-
sor McDonald noted, it was in the states that real spending oc-
curred.21 In 1900, for example, state and local expenditures were ten
times the amount of federal spending.22 In this context, it is instruc-
tive to recall that the governors in some forty-six states clearly have
the power under state constitutions or by legislation to exercise the
line-item veto.
Another way of looking at the constitutional provisions is to ask
what the word "bill" means. Even before the Glazier thesis, Profes-
sor William Clineburg argued that the common assumption that the
presentment clause requires the President to choose to sign or veto a
"bill" may be incorrect:
Mhis view rests on the assumed premise that any legislative instrument
passed by the Congress is a "Bill" ifso entitled-whether it treats of one sub-
ject or of many, unrelated subjects. This assumption is, at best, a tenuous one,
and such validity as can be ascribed to it must derive from the notion that a
baseless assumption achieves a degree of invulnerability with age and
repetition.
2 3
In the extreme case, consider the result if Congress can simply col-
lect any number of bills into one "bill" and deliver it to the Presi-
dent. This seeming fantasy has in recent years approached reality.
Indeed, in the budget context, this is precisely what Congress has
done for the past several years. Instead of the required thirteen sepa-
rate spending bills mandated by the 1974 budget bill, Congress has
passed what it labels a "Continuing Resolution" that can include up
to all the spending bills for the year. This was precisely the strategy
Congress followed in the fall of 1990, when Continuing Resolutions
were presented to President Bush. He had the choice either of "clos-
ing down the government," which he did over the Columbus Day
weekend in October 1990,24 or signing a mammoth spending bill in its
entirety.
Yet the clear purpose of the addition of the otherwise otiose Clause
3 was to ensure the accountability that underpins our political sys-
tem. If Congress can simply overwhelm the President and the public
with a single spending provision once a year, responsibility for the
budget begins to disappear. Indeed, in recent years the "budget bill"
20. Id.
21. Id. at 6.
22. Id.
23. Clineburg, The Presidential Veto Power, 18 S.C.L. REv. 732, 751 (1966) (empha-
sis added).
24. Statement on the Veto of a Resolution Providing Funding for Continued Gov-
ernment Operation, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1532-33 (Oct. 5, 1990). President
Bush proclaimed, "The hour of reckoning is at hand .... Congress... must face up to
the shutdown of government services... because we could not produce a budget." Id.
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has in fact been a collection of pieces of paper collected in several
cardboard boxes that not one congressman has read in its entirety
before being called on to vote for the new budget. Likewise, it is a
mockery of the ten-day veto period to imagine that the President,
with all his officials, can seriously read the entire document before
deciding whether to sign or veto the budget.
We have had several examples of the practical vitiation of the veto
power. Once the 1989 budget was approved by Congress and signed
by President Reagan, it was learned that the bill contained a patently
unconstitutional provision aimed at breaking up a media company
that was hostile to the author of the provision, Democratic Senator
Kennedy. The provision had the clear and intended effect of forcing
Rupert Murdoch to sell either his profitable television stations or his
money-losing (and anti-Kennedy) Boston Herald and New York Post
newspapers.25 There eventually was litigation invalidating the provi-
25. Provisions inserted into massive budget bills are often only discovered by most
congressmen, the executive branch and the public after the bills are passed and signed.
The following editorial published by The Wall Street Journal in February 1988 de-
scribes one such provision, which was aimed at punishing a certain newspaper pub-
lisher for political reasons:
There is a lot of talk about Ronald Reagan's legacy of budget deficits, de-
spite the fact that only Congress appropriates. The true legacy is the insight
by the liberal leadership that Congress can destroy all presidential influence
over the budget by obliterating his veto power. This is done by passing an all-
in-one appropriations bill each year, "Continuing resolutions" that can't be ve-
toed without closing down the entire government.
Secret expenditures snuck into these resolutions, even the 20% pay hike for
congressional staffers, do not embarrass leading congressmen. Far from it.
We have found an official congressional boast over its budget tyranny. In a
remarkable legal brief, lawyers for House Speaker Jim Wright asked a court
to dismiss a lawsuit by Rupert Murdoch by proclaiming legislators as the new
untouchables. They argue that there is nothing anyone can do to stop dead-of-
night provisions that dish out pork or that use the budget process to attack
Mr. Murdoch's New York Post and Boston Herald.
The attack on Mr. Murdoch, you will recall, came in the form of an appro-
priations rider prohibiting any Federal Communications Commission expendi-
ture to extend any waivers of the cross-ownership rule "currently in effect."
That affects only Mr. Murdoch, who on Saturday arranged a forced sale of the
Post. His lawyers told the Federal Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C., that
this violated several constitutional provisions, including. equal protection, due
process, the First Amendment, the rule against bills of attainder and the tak-
ings clause.
The most intriguing argument to us, though, was that the provision violates
the presentment clause, which says that the President must have the opportu-
nity to veto all legislation. "The appropriations process is used as a Trojan
Horse to smuggle new substantive legislation into being," the Murdoch brief
argued, "without providing the President a meaningful option to veto it." This
is very similar to the argument made by our contributor Stephen Glazier that
a President faced with a $604 billion, all-in-one continuing resolution could le-
gitimately assert a line-item veto and blue-pen offending provisions. The
sion, but the point is that in a massive, all-in-one budget all sorts of
mischief becomes possible. There is little likelihood that a President
or his staff would discover such a provision in the limited time before
a President must choose between signing and vetoing.
Merely identifying a continuing abuse of the budget process by
Congress, even an abuse that raises constitutional questions, does not
alone answer the question of what response a President can or
should make. However, once we see that a single spending bill vio-
lates the very purpose which Clause 3 was added to serve, the only
question that remains is what constitutional powers the President
can invoke to force Congress to cease this practice. It is here that in-
vocation of the inherent line-item veto may seem an appropriate,
measured, and proportional response to congressional evisceration of
the President's powers under the presentment clause.
II. THE IMPOUNDMENT POWER
One alternative is the more radical step of exercising impound-
ments in violation of the 1974 law, arguing with good evidence that
White House has cited the Kennedy attack on Mr. Murdoch as an example of
a line item it would have liked to veto.
There is some precedent for courts disciplining the political branches for
usurping the other's legislative authority. There are cases against the aggres-
sive use by Presidents of the pocket veto. Irony of ironies, Teddy Kennedy
himself won one of these'cases, when in 1974 the courts invalidated a pocket
veto during an intrasession adjournment because one house had arranged a
system to receive the veto message.
The Murdoch brief pointed out that the continuing resolution has precisely
the same problem on the other side. "Just as the President is obliged to exer-
cise the pocket-veto power in accordance with both its letter and spirit," the
brief said, "so Congress is obliged to respect both the letter and spirit of the
presentment clause."
To all this, the brief for Rep. Wright says simply that substituting last-min-
ute continuing resolutions for separate budget bills has "been Congress' prac-
tice of late," and for that reason alone is perfectly proper. The brief asserted:
"There can be little dispute over Congress' right to deal with appropriations as
it decides," even if it nullifies the veto, threat. Congress has become the son
who kills his parents, then pleads for leniency on the grounds that he is an
orphan.
Rep. Wright is lucky that the court probably won't have to reach this pre-
sentment-clause issue to rescue Mr. Murdoch. The judges could invalidate the
Kennedy provision on a narrower ground. The Supreme Court has said that
constitutionality of the crossover rules depends on FCC discretion to waive
the rules when a newspaper otherwise could close. The Kennedy provision
denies such discretion. Still, we wouldn't be surprised if the court had some-
thing to say about congressional budget power plays. Especially because, coin-
cidentally, two of the three judges hearing this case are Laurence Silberman
and Stephen Williams, who signed the recent opinion invalidating "independ-
ent counsels" for violating separation of powers.
Outside of the congressional leadership, patience is wearing thin on pork-
barreling continuing resolutions. There are even congressmen who say they
want to pass separate budget bills this year. We'll see. What seems more
likely is that either a President or the'courts or both someday will have to
rescue the veto by forcing Congress to give up its arrogant ways.
Legislating Trojan Horses, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1988, at 20, col. 1.
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impoundment is an inherent executive branch power that cannot be
removed by statute. Instead, it has been argued that the failure of
Presidents to invoke a line-item veto during a period when they rou-
tinely exercised the impoundment power is somehow evidence that
there is no line-item veto power. One such criticism is in the form of
an observation that apparently, until recently, no one thought the
line-item veto existed. Charles Cooper, former Assistant Attorney
General of the Office of Legal Counsel, has written that those who
assert that there is an inherent line-item veto "are met first with the
question: Why has no President in 200 years noticed this fact?"26 The
simplest answer is that until 1974, Presidents exercised a power far
broader than a veto over spending: the impoundment power. At the
very least, the fact that the impoundment power existed for nearly
200 years rebuts any negative inference that could be drawn from the
fact that no President before George Bush asserted or exercised an
inherent line-item veto.27 Impoundment differs from the line-item
veto in its absolute character. Unlike other vetoes, there is no oppor-
tunity for Congress to override an impoundment. There is no specific
constitutional authority for impoundment, although it may be inher-
ent in the executive power as it was understood at the time of the
Founding; that is, appropriations were considered permissive but not
mandatory. Whatever the justification for the impoundment power,
its frequent use by Presidents until 1974 explains why no President
was left with the choice of line-item vetoing a spending bill or facing
omnibus appropriations that Congress took care to make inevitable
under the then-current political circumstances. 2s
In more recent years, every President, from Franklin D. Roosevelt
through Richard Nixon, used the impoundment power to limit spend-
ing. President Roosevelt, for example, impounded $500 million that
had been appropriated for public works.29 President John Kennedy
cut spending by six percent through the impoundment power. 30
President Lyndon Johnson in 1966 alone impounded some five billion
26. Cooper, The Line-Item Veto: The Framers' Intentions, in PORK BARRELS, supra
note 5, at 29.
27. Glazier, Line-Item Veto Hides Under an Alias, Wall St. J., March 18, 1988, at
26, col. 4. Presidents Washington and Adams exercised the impoundment power by
"mak[ing] specific spending decisions." Id.
28. See Comment, Addressing the Resurgences of Presidential Budgetmaking Ini-
tiative: A Proposal to Reform the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 63 TEx. L. REV.
693, 695-98 (1988).
29. Crovitz, Introduction, in PORK BARRELS, supra note 5, at x.
30. Id.
dollars.3 1 It was when a politically weakened President Nixon at-
tempted to impound twelve billion dollars in appropriated funds, in-
cluding six billion dollars of an eleven billion dollar sewage
treatment bill, that Congress passed the budget law in 1974, over his
veto, that purported to take away the impoundment power.3 2
III. THE LINE-ITEM VETO PASSES ITS TEST
There is even a case to be made that President Bush has already
exercised the line-item veto. One provision in the Fiscal Year 1990
appropriations act purported to limit the activities of the Office of
Management and Budget, an office that reports directly to the Presi-
dent. It included a rider that prohibited the President from spending
any funds to apply a cost-benefit analysis to agricultural marketing
orders.33 J. Gregory Sidak has noted that this provision is in appar-
ent violation of the recommendation clause,34 under which the Presi-
dent shall make recommendations to Congress on matters of his
choosing.3 5
In his signing statement of November 3, 1989, President Bush exer-
cised what appears to be a line-item veto. He wrote that the muz-
zling restrictions on the Office of Management and Budget "raise
constitutional concerns because they impair my ability as President
to supervise the executive branch."36 President Bush wrote that he
had the authority to order executive branch officials to "implement
the provisions [of the appropriations rider] in a manner consistent
with the Constitution."3 7
Relying on INS v. Chadha,38 President Bush also effectively line-
item vetoed a legislative veto provision:
In addition, numerous provisions of H.R. 2989 purport to condition my author-
ity, and the authority of affected executive branch officials, to use funds
otherwise appropriated by the Act on the approval of various committees of
the House of Representatives and the Senate. These provisions constitute leg-
islative veto devices .... Accordingly, I will treat them as having no legal
force of effect in this or any other legislation in which they appear. I direct
agencies confronted with these devices to consult with the Attorney General
31. Glazier, Line-Item Veto Hides Under an Alias, Wall St. J., March 18, 1988, at
26, col. 4.
32. Crovitz, Introduction, in PORK BARRELS, supra note 5, at x.
33. Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-136, § 1, 103 Stat. 783, 793 (1989).
34. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
35. Sidak, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw.
U.L. REv. 437, 458 (1990). See generally Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO.
L.J. 2079 (1989).
36. Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government
Appropriations Act of 1990, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1669, 1670 (Nov. 3, 1989).
37. Id.
38. 462 U.S. 919 (1983)(wherein the Supreme Court held that a legislative veto
provision was unconstitutional).
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to determine whether the grant of authority in question is severable from the
unconstitutional condition.3 9
President Bush included similar declarations in subsequent signing
statements making clear that he would refuse to enforce certain pro-
visions in a bill, yet enforce the remainder. Along with the legisla-
tive veto problem, for example, President Bush also vetoed parts of a
State Department authorization bill stating that nine separate provi-
sions unconstitutionally violated his foreign-policy powers under the
Constitution.40 These examples illustrate one kind of the line-item
veto - where the President considers the provisions unconstitu-
tional. It would be a different sort of line-item veto to reject a provi-
sion on the ground that it included unwise or foolish spending, but
there is no obvious reason why a line-item veto could be asserted by a
President for constitutional reasons and not for prudential ones.
IV. OTHER INHERENT ExEcuTIvE BRANCH BUDGET AUTHORITY
The debate about the line-item veto cannot occur in a constitu-
tional vacuum. Ultimately, the question is what political steps a
President is willing to take in order to protect his constitutional pow-
ers and duties. In this respect, the mirror issue of the line-item veto
in the context of spending is the President's own power of the purse
to order funding that is not appropriated. To the degree that such a
power exists and that Presidents have used such a power, there may
be some lessons in the powers of a President to defend his ability to
stop expenditures through a veto.
The appropriations clause of the Constitution states that "[n]o
money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Ap-
propriations made by Law."41 This clause has been generally under-
stood to establish a "sole power of the purse" by Congress through
legislation. J. Gregory Sidak has noted, however, that "by Law" can
include as sources of legal legitimacy not only legislation but also the
"Constitution .... treaties, the common law and contract."4 2 Indeed,
the Justice Department has taken the position that there are inher-
ent constitutional powers in the executive branch to order or author-
ize the expenditure of funds even without prior congressional
approval. President Abraham Lincoln's expenditures at the outbreak
39. 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc., supra note 36, at 1670.
40. Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1990 and 1991, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 266-68 (Feb. 16, 1990).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
42. Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1162, 1167-68.
of the Civil War43 are a well known example.
Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, who served under President
Jimmy Carter, wrote an opinion in 1981 for the Office of Legal Coun-
sel, Department of Justice, that justifies many incidents of presiden-
tial authorization for funding. These include many occasions of
presidential funding authorization during short periods of suspended
budget authority when Congress temporarily failed to pass new budg-
ets in time to replace old budget authority.44 One justification is
purely statutory. The Anti-Deficiency Act provides that "[a]n officer
or employee of the United States... may not accept voluntary serv-
ices for [the United States] or employ personal services exceeding
that authorized by law, except for emergencies involving the safety of
human life or the protection of property."45 The emergency excep-
tion for expenditures to protect life or property is a statutory author-
ization for presidential approval of spending that has not been
specifically authorized by Congress.
There is a good case, however, that this statutory delegation to the
President merely codifies an inherent constitutional power in the
President. Attorney General Civiletti explained that the Anti-Defi-
ciency Act "is not the only source of law or the only exercise of con-
gressional power that must be weighed in determining whether the
President has authority for an initiative that obligates funds in ad-
vance of appropriations." 46 Instead, Mr. Civiletti wrote, "[t]he Presi-
dent's obligational authority may be strengthened in connection with
initiatives that are grounded in the peculiar institutional powers and
competency of the President," which might include, for example,
"the conduct of foreign relations essential to national security."47
Thus, Mr. Civiletti concluded that the authorized "by Law" language
of the appropriations clause would include "those obligations neces-
sarily incident to presidential initiatives undertaken within his con-
stitutional powers."48
If the President has inherent constitutional powers to order appro-
priations, this provides a check against possible congressional efforts
to prohibit appropriations to pay for core executive branch func-
tions.49 Likewise, there may be an inherent power in the President
that enables the executive branch to defeat congressional efforts to
43. See id., at 1189-90.
44. Authority for the Continuance of Government Functions During a Temporary
Lapse in Appropriations, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1, 4-5 (1981) [hereinafter Civiletti
Memorandum].
45. 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
46. Civiletti Memorandum, supra note 44, at 6.
47. Id. at 6-7.
48. Id. at 7.
49. Sidak, supra note 42, at 1193. One example is that Congress could not prohibit
spending for a pen that the President would use to veto a bill.
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usurp the other political branch's spending powers. The inherent
line-item veto thus gains justification as analogous to the inherent
power to authorize appropriations when necessary to protect the con-
stitutional design of separated powers and duties.
'V. CONCLUSION
The question of whether the, President has an inherent line-item
veto power has never been clearly determined by any court, although
there have been dicta suggesting that no such power exists.50 There
is a good case that the power does exist. There is also a good case
that the invocation of the line-item veto is a proportional response to
the congressional practice of evading the presentment clause by of-
fering last-minute, all-in-one spending bills that give the President
the dubious choice of signing or closing down the government. Pow-
ers may exist in the text or the structure of the Constitution, but
unexercised powers exist only in the abstract. A President has a
duty to enforce the presentment clause as it was intended, which in-
cludes defending his veto power. Invocation and exercise of an inher-
ent line-item veto may be the best,.and perhaps only, way for a
President to re-establish the political accountability that the Foun-
ders' Constitution intended each political branch to have for the fed-
eral budget and its deficits.
50. See, e.g., Lear Singler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988)(line-item
veto does not exist in federal constitution), reh'g ordered, 863 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1988),
withdrawn on other grounds, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

